Various types of size-based regulations for rms are typical in most countries (tax schedules, accounting rules, health and safety standards etc.). However, there is only limited evidence of how owners of small rms respond to such rules, and what are the underlying mechanisms behind the observed behavior. We study these questions by examining the eects of the value-added tax (VAT) threshold using tax register data on the universe of Finnish rms and their owners. We nd sizable bunching of rms in the sales distribution just below the sales-based VAT threshold. This implies that small rms actively avoid VAT liability. We utilize variation in both the VAT rate and reporting procedures to provide compelling evidence that the response is caused by compliance costs of the VAT system rather than the size of the tax rate. This shows that the costs related to reporting and understanding taxes can induce greater distortions than pure tax incentives, especially among low-income entrepreneurs. In addition, we nd no explicit evidence of avoidance or evasion, which suggests that rms respond by reducing true output. Also, bunching behavior is very permanent, implying that the VAT threshold hinders the growth of small rms.
Introduction
Various types of size-based regulations for small rms and entrepreneurs are common in most countries.
These rules are apparent in, for example, tax schedules and tax enforcement regulations, accounting rules, and health and safety standards. The main issue with these regulations is that they create incentives for rms to stay small. Such incentives are generally undesirable, as they can signicantly distort the ecient rm-size distribution (see, e.g., Dharmapala, et. al To more comprehensively understand the implications of size-based rules, it is crucial to know which incentives aect the behavior of rms and their owners. For example, in many tax systems, tax liability increases and regulation tightens simultaneously at a given threshold (e.g., above a certain level of turnover or taxable prots). Most previous studies focus on analyzing the tax rate elasticity, that is, how much the relative change in the tax rate aects the outcome variable of interest (see, e.g., Kleven and Waseem (2013), Best (2014) and Devereux et al. (2014) ). However, it could also be that compliance costs (reporting costs, understanding the tax rules etc.) cause even more signicant behavioral responses at the threshold (Slemrod and Gillitzer (2014) ). Therefore, traditional tax elasticity estimates could severely overstate the importance of tax rates if changes in compliance costs are also signicant. This paper studies the underlying mechanisms behind observed responses to the size-based valueadded tax (VAT) threshold among small rms and low-income entrepreneurs. We provide compelling evidence on whether responses are caused by tax incentives or compliance costs by utilizing variation in both tax rates and reporting procedures over time. In addition, we study the anatomy of the response by examining whether the response is driven by avoidance or evasion behavior rather than changes in real economic activity. Finally, we utilize the panel feature of the data to analyze the eects of the threshold on the growth of small rms.
We exploit the VAT threshold in Finland to analyze these questions.
1 In Finland, rms with annual sales below 8,500 euros are not liable to pay or report VAT. Therefore, both tax incentives (remitted VAT) and compliance costs (e.g., frequent reporting of VAT or accountant service payments, and understanding the VAT system) change at this threshold in a discontinuous manner.
We utilize high-quality tax register data on the universe of Finnish rms and their owners from 1 VAT is a broadly based tax assessed on the value added to goods and services. VAT is a commonly applied form of consumption taxation in many countries. Most VAT systems include varying thresholds below which rms are exempt from remitting and reporting VAT. For example, in the EU countries, the VAT thresholds vary between 0-100,000 euros. Half of the EU countries apply thresholds below 25,000 euros, including, for example, Germany, Belgium and Denmark. 20002013 . We exploit the bunching methodology introduced by Saez (2010) and further developed by Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven and Waseem (2013) , to study whether these incentives induce small rms not to exceed the VAT threshold. In short, the bunching method utilizes the excess mass in the sales distribution at the discontinuous threshold to infer the extent of the intensive margin behavioral response caused by it. A particular advantage of the bunching approach is that we obtain visually clear and convincing results on the eects of the threshold.
The VAT threshold in Finland aects dierent types of rms and owners. First, 90% of the rms in the neighborhood of the threshold are single-owned entities, which implies that rm-level decisions typically reect the choices and preferences of a single entrepreneur. Second, approximately 35% of small rms operate in the service sector, but the overall heterogeneity in the industry classication is notable.
Third, over 50% of the owners of small rms have low personal taxable income (capital + earned income < 10,000 euros), which implies that the rm is an important source of disposable income for many entrepreneurs. However, approximately 20% of the owners have relevant personal income sources outside the rm (> 30,000 euros), indicating that the rm constitutes a secondary source of income for many part-time entrepreneurs.
As our rst result, we observe that the VAT threshold causes a large and signicant overall behavioral response. We nd distinctive and robust bunching of rms in the sales distribution just below the threshold. This shows that small rms actively avoid VAT liability. Our results point out that all types of owners and rms respond signicantly. However, the behavioral eects are more pronounced among low-income entrepreneurs and sole proprietors, which suggests that the distortions caused by the threshold are the largest among these groups.
We utilize various sources of variation in VAT rates and compliance costs at the threshold to provide compelling evidence of the factors that cause small rms to avoid VAT liability. First, before 2004, the average VAT rate increased sharply if a rm exceeded the threshold. Firms above the threshold were liable to fully pay the VAT on all sales, including sales below the threshold. In 2004, Finland introduced a VAT relief scheme in which the average tax rate increases only gradually above the threshold. For an example rm with sales of 10,000 euros and no tax-deductible expenses, the remitted VAT decreased from 2,200 euros to 250 euros after the reform, implying that the VAT relief system induced a drastic reduction in remitted VAT in the neighborhood of the threshold. Second, Finland experimented with targeted VAT rate reductions to certain specic types of services. Consequently, the VAT rate for hairdressers and barbers was reduced from 22% to 8% in 20072011. At the same time, the VAT rate for similar services such as beauty salons remained unchanged. By utilizing these VAT rate changes at the threshold, we can examine how the tax rate aects the behavior of rms and owners.
In addition to the VAT rate changes at the threshold, compliance costs related to VAT reporting changed in 2010. First, before 2010, rms needed to le a separate tax form in order to receive the VAT relief. After 2010, the VAT relief can be applied by simply ticking a box in the regular VAT form.
Second, after 2010, small rms with annual sales below 25,000 euros are liable to report VAT annually, in contrast to monthly VAT reporting before 2010. Both of these changes arguably reduced the compliance costs of VAT reporting among small rms. By exploiting this explicit variation in compliance costs, we can study the role of compliance costs in explaining the observed behavior of rms at the threshold.
To our knowledge, this is the rst paper that presents these types of results. Also, we provide a novel contribution to the literature by studying how small rms and low-income entrepreneurs respond to dierent types of incentives.
Surprisingly, we nd that even considerable reductions in the VAT rate do not aect the extent of the bunching response. We do not observe any changes in the observed behavior after the drastic drop in the VAT rate at the threshold in 2004, nor between similar industries that faced dierent changes in VAT rates over time (hairdressers vs. beauty salons). In contrast, the excess mass below the threshold decreased sharply when compliance costs were reduced in 2010. In addition, we observe a sharp jump in voluntary VAT registration for rms below the threshold exactly in 2010, and an increase in the take-up rate of the VAT relief after the reduction in compliance costs, highlighting the importance of compliance costs.
Our results strongly indicate that compliance costs are the key factor in explaining observed behavior. This implies that decreasing compliance costs by, for example, simplifying and reducing reporting procedures can reduce the distortions caused by the threshold. This is particularly relevant for small rms. The compliance costs incurred by exceeding the threshold are mostly xed, and therefore the relative signicance of them is likely to be larger for smaller rms and low-income entrepreneurs than for larger entities. In addition, the results highlight that interpreting the behavioral response to be caused solely by the VAT rate would largely overestimate the signicance of tax incentives. If we interpret the whole response to stem from tax incentives, we nd that the implied local tax rate elasticity jumped discretely from 0.2 to 0.9 in 2004 when the VAT rate at the threshold was signicantly reduced. However, it is implausible that such a sudden hike would have occurred in the underlying average tax elasticity of entrepreneurs.
In addition, the nature of the response entails important policy implications. Firms can respond to the VAT threshold both by reducing output, or by engaging in various tax avoidance activities or systematic underreporting of sales. In general, real output responses are more detrimental in terms of welfare compared to avoidance activities that induce smaller changes in the extent of overall economic activity (see, e.g., Slemrod (1992) ). Also, avoidance and evasion responses can be more easily aected by the policy maker, compared to inuencing the real economic activity of small rms and entrepreneurs.
We nd no direct evidence of tax avoidance or evasion, nor that splitting larger rms into smaller entities would explain the response. Potential discontinuous changes in production factors, such as equity and expenses, exactly at the threshold shed light on how rms respond to the threshold (see, e.g., Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2016)). For example, if rms would avoid exceeding the threshold by systematically underreporting their sales, we should observe larger rms bunching just below the threshold. Nevertheless, we nd no support for larger rms locating just below the threshold. Therefore, we interpret that rms respond by changes in output and real economic activity, implying that the eciency eects of the VAT threshold can be notable.
Size-based thresholds typically create incentives for rms to stay small, which could induce negative growth eects and cause signicant long-run eciency losses (see, e.g., Guner et. al. (2008) , and Gourio and Roys (2014)). In the Finnish context, the VAT threshold could hinder growth if rms avoid exceeding the threshold for a prolonged period of time. The panel structure of the data allows us to follow rms over time, and thus examine the eects of the threshold on growth. In addition, we compare small Finnish rms in labor-intensive industries to similar rms in Sweden. There is no VAT threshold in Sweden, and thus Swedish rms represent an intuitive benchmark for analyzing the growth eects of the Finnish threshold. Furthermore, despite the dierent VAT threshold policy, Finland and Sweden are very similar in terms of the VAT system (VAT rates), the business tax structure and the overall institutional and cultural framework.
Our results show that bunching behavior is very permanent, as a signicant share of rms avoid exceeding the threshold for many consecutive years. Our evidence indicates that this negative growth eect is focused on low-income entrepreneurs rather than part-time owners with signicant income outside the rm. Combined with the evidence of real economic responses, this suggests that the threshold has direct eects especially on the well-being of low-income entrepreneurs. Moreover, comparison of Finnish and Swedish rms in labor-intensive industries supports the overall conclusion that the VAT threshold has notable eects on growth. In 20052013, the average annual growth of Finnish rms just below the threshold was zero, while comparable Swedish rms increased their sales by 1015%. In contrast, the dierence in growth rates is insignicant at larger levels of sales, highlighting the detrimental eects of the threshold. This paper contributes to several branches of literature. First, our results add to the scarce empirical literature examining the eects of dierent size-based rules and regulations on rm behavior. Best et. al (2015) study the turnover and prot tax kinks in Pakistan and observe that rms bunch sharply at the kink point that separates the turnover and prot tax regimes. Similarly to our analysis, they also utilize variation in incentives over time and across rms to show that tax evasion is mainly driving the observed behavior. Gourio and Roys (2014) and Garicano et. al. (2013) examine the eects of an employee threshold (50 pers.) in France above which many types of costs and regulations increase (e.g. payroll tax rate and ring costs). Both of these papers nd that this threshold clearly aects the rmsize distribution and the productivity of rms. Finally, Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2016) study the responses to a tax enforcement threshold using Spanish rm data. They nd that rms avoid exceeding the stricter enforcement by bunching just below the threshold, and observe that the eect is driven by evasion responses.
Despite the generally applied VAT thresholds, only a few previous papers study the eects of these thresholds. The theoretical literature has characterized the rules for an optimal VAT threshold. Keen and Mintz (2004) and Kanbur and Keen (2014) show that the optimal VAT threshold depends on administrative and compliance costs, and the extent of rm responses to the threshold.
2 The existing empirical literature has focused on VAT thresholds concerning larger rms. Onji (2009) was the rst to detect clear eects of the VAT threshold on the distribution of rms in Japan. He shows that large Japanese rms reacted to the introduction of a VAT threshold by splitting into smaller entities, reecting clear tax avoidance behavior. Li and Lockwood (2015) show that rms in the UK bunch actively at the relatively large VAT threshold (approx. 100,000 euros). Also, Waseem (2015) observes a clustering of rms at the VAT threshold (approx. 42,000 euros) in Pakistan, and Boonzaaier et al. (2016) in South Africa (approx. 63,000 euros). In contrast, Asatryan and Peichl (2016) nd no responses to the VAT threshold in Armenia (approx. 150,000 euros), but nd that rms respond to other regulative thresholds. We contribute to this literature by analyzing the eects of the threshold among small rms, and by carefully examining the mechanisms behind the observed responses.
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Furthermore, our paper adds to the literature on the costs related to reporting taxes and understanding the tax code. Chetty et al. (2009) show that the salience of sales tax rates is an important part of explaining behavioral responses among consumers. Benzarti (2016) studies the amount of hassle costs related to tax ling using register data on US income tax returns. He nds that these costs are much larger than the previous estimates are suggesting. In addition, Gelber et. al. (2015) estimate the adjustment costs related to the social security kink in the US. They nd that these xed adjustment costs are essential, and should thus be included in the analysis when estimating the earning elasticities.
Finally, we contribute to the literature that apply the bunching method to analyze the behavioral responses to income tax rate discontinuities among entrepreneurs. For example, Devereux et al. (2014) nd that small corporations in the UK respond sharply to a jump in the corporate income tax rate. Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2011) and Bastani and Selin (2014) nd that entrepreneurs, in particular, tend to respond actively to discontinuous jumps in their personal marginal income tax rates in the US, Denmark and Sweden, respectively. Supporting these results, the vast literature on taxable income responses to income tax rates show that entrepreneurs are particularly responsive, but the responses can be typically explained by tax avoidance behavior (see a survey by Saez et al. (2012) , and Harju and Matikka (2016) 2 Also, Zee (2005) oers a formula for setting the optimal VAT threshold. 3 Our paper also relates to other studies examining the behavioral eects of consumption taxes. Many previous papers estimate the price-incidence of VAT rate reductions. For example, Kosonen (2015) and Harju et al. (2015) utilize VAT rate reductions for hairdressers and restaurants in Finland and Sweden to study price pass-through responses. Carbonnier (2007) studies the incidence of VAT rate reductions on car sales and housing repair services in France, and Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) examine the eects of the sales tax on gasoline prices in the US using state-level variation.
for evidence for Finland). This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the VAT threshold in Finland, and the conceptual bunching methodology and estimation strategy. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 oers the results, and Section 5 concludes the study.
Institutions and methodology

Value-added taxation
Most developed countries use the value-added tax (VAT) as their primary consumption tax system. VAT is usually a broadly based tax assessed on the value added to goods and services. The amount of value added is calculated by subtracting the amount of externally purchased goods and services from the value of goods and services produced and sold.
In short, the VAT assessment process is the following: each trader in the chain of supply (from manufacturers to retailers) charges VAT on their sales. Individual rms are entitled to deduct from this amount the VAT paid on purchases. VAT is remitted to the tax authorities by the seller of the goods and services.
VAT is an important source of tax revenue in many countries. In Finland, VAT accounts for approximately one third of all tax revenue. Among OECD countries, almost one-fth of all tax revenue is collected by VAT. However, the variation in VAT revenue is large across countries.
Finland, as a member of the European Union (EU), applies the general EU VAT legislation (European Commission (2006a)). All members of the EU apply a standard VAT rate of at least 15%. The EU allows member countries to use a maximum of two reduced VAT rates for specic products and services, such as food and pharmaceuticals.
The standard VAT rate in Finland is 24% (in 2016). The standard rate applies to most goods and services. Finland uses two reduced VAT rates: a 14% rate is applied to e.g. food and restaurant services, and 10% is applied to e.g. books and pharmaceuticals.
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Some goods and services are exempt from VAT. These include nancial and insurance activities, letting and operation of dwellings, education, health services and social work activities. A rm that sells solely these goods or services are not liable to pay VAT in Finland.
Moreover, the EU legislation allows member states to apply reduced VAT rates for certain laborintensive industries (European Commission (2006b)). Finland experimented with a special reduced VAT rate for hairdresser and barber services. In 2007-2011, the VAT rate for hairdressers was decreased from 22% to 8%.
5 However, other similar services, such as those oered in beauty salons, were not part of 4 Until 2010, the standard VAT rate was 22% in Finland. The standard VAT rate was increased to 23% in 2010, and to 24% in 2013. The rst reduced rate was 17% until 2009. It was decreased to 12% in 2009, and increased to 13% in 2010 and to 14% in 2013. The second reduced rate was 8% until 2010, and was increased to 9% in 2010 and to 10% in 2013. 5 Kosonen (2015) studies the incidence and eciency implications of this reform.
the experiment and thus not subject to the reduced VAT rate. Following Kosonen (2015) , we utilize this variation in VAT rates across similar services to study the eect of the VAT rate on the behavior of small rms. 6 
VAT threshold
In many VAT systems, rms with annual sales below a certain threshold are not required to remit VAT and report sales and purchases subject to VAT to the tax authority. Figure 1 shows these annual sales thresholds among the OECD countries in 2014. The gure highlights that the thresholds vary notably across countries. While some countries levy VAT on all sales without a specied VAT threshold (e.g. Sweden and Turkey), some countries apply relatively high thresholds around 100,000 euros (e.g. 7 Therefore, the threshold has remained constant from 1995 in nominal terms, although it was increased to 10,000 euros in 2016.
Switzerland and the UK
Finally, even though small rms below the threshold are exempt from VAT, they need to report their 6 As another reduced VAT rate experiment, the VAT rate for restaurant meals was decreased from 22% to 13% in July 2010. Harju, Kosonen and Nordstrom-Skans (2015) study the rm-level heterogeneity in price pass-through using the VAT rate reductions for restaurant meals in Finland and Sweden. 7 The ocial conversion rate was dened to be such that 1 euro is equivalent to 5.94573 marks. The euro was introduced as an account currency already in 1999, but euro banknotes and coins were circulated from the beginning of 2002. Therefore, the three years (19992002) were a transition period preparing for the euro (see e.g. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_nance/euro/countries/nland_en.htm).
overall sales to the Tax Administration for income tax purposes. Therefore, we have data on annual sales of rms below the threshold, as this information is required for income tax purposes.
Tax incentives at the threshold.
Next, we describe the main details related to the VAT threshold in
Finland. We focus on recent policy changes that aected both the size of tax incentives and compliance costs. We utilize this variation in our main analysis when studying the mechanisms behind observed rm behavior.
We begin by describing the discontinuous change in tax incentives at the threshold. For illustrative purposes, the representative rm is assumed to have no deductible VAT from purchases, implying that the value added equals the sales of the rm.
The gure illustrates that the pre-reform system created a salient VAT notch , implying a clear jump in the remitted VAT and the average VAT rate from 0 to 22% at the threshold (standard VAT rate was 22% until July 1st 2010 in Finland). After the reform, the notch was replaced by a VAT kink, implying gradually increasing remitted VAT and average VAT rate above the threshold. Within the VAT relief scheme, gradually increasing average VAT rate implies an increasing marginal VAT rate above the threshold up to the point in which the average VAT rate equals 22%. This leads to marginal VAT rates between 13-57% above the threshold within the relief region. Figure 2 highlights the striking dierence in tax incentives between the two VAT regimes. Consider a rm with annual sales equal to 10,000 euros, which thus exceeds the VAT threshold by 1,500 euros.
Before 2004, the average VAT rate on all value added of this rm was 22%. However, after 2004, the average VAT rate is around 2.5%, which is over eight times smaller than before the reform. Thus, in terms of pure tax incentives, the reform induced a distinctive change at the threshold. However, as can be seen from the gure, the dierence between the regimes decreases at larger sales levels, and disappears above the relief region. Notes. The Figure shows the remitted VAT and average VAT rates for a representative rm which is subject to the standard VAT rate in the year in question. For simplicity, the rm is assumed to have no tax-deductible VAT from purchases. This implies that the value added equals the sales of the rm. In addition to remitted VAT, a rm faces other costs when exceeding the threshold.
We refer to these as compliance costs. These include reporting and accounting costs related to VAT reporting. In addition, compliance costs contain cognitive costs of understanding the VAT system and applying the rules of VAT legislation.
In more detail, once a rm becomes liable to pay VAT, it needs to mechanically le separate periodic reports on sales and purchases subject to VAT to the Tax Administration. This procedure can be executed by the owner, or she can purchase an accounting service to conduct the VAT reporting for the rm. The reporting obligation covers sales at dierent VAT rates, input purchases, zero-rated sales, and imports and exports. Also, the rm is legally required to separate the share of the VAT from the selling price in all receipts and invoices, which increases compliance costs.
In addition, the complex reporting procedures and detailed VAT rules can be dicult to learn and comprehend. Thus exceeding the threshold is likely to induce cognitive costs for the owners of small rms.
The compliance costs of VAT reporting changed in 2010. First, before 2010, rms needed to apply for the VAT relief using a separate tax form in order to be eligible for the reduced VAT payments above the threshold (the VAT relief system is described above). From 2010 onward, rms can apply for the VAT relief by simply ticking a box in the same periodic tax form they use to declare remitted VAT. This simplied procedure reduced the mechanical burden of lling out tax forms, and likely made the current VAT system more transparent.
Second, the frequency of the required VAT reports was changed. Before 2010, all rms needed to ll a VAT report on a monthly basis.
8 After 2010, rms with the annual sales below 25,000 euros are required to report their VAT annually. This reform thus decreased the reporting costs of VAT. In addition to small rms close to the VAT threshold, rms with annual sales between 25,000-50,000 euros are required to ll the VAT report quarterly, in contrast to monthly reporting before 2010.
Overall, both of these reforms reduced the compliance costs related to VAT registration for small rms. We utilize this variation to study whether reduced compliance costs aect the behavior of small rms close to the threshold.
Voluntary registration.
Firms that do not exceed the VAT threshold can voluntarily register and pay VAT. There are logical reasons for registering even when it is not necessary. First, a rm can only deduct the VAT from its purchases if it is registered, and thus voluntary registration could be important for businesses that have, for example, large start-up costs. Second, rms below the threshold that have a large share of business-to-business sales have an increased incentive to register, as the VAT rebate is only possible from purchases of VAT registered rms. Thus some VAT registered rms might prefer other VAT registered rms in business-to-business sales. Third, VAT registration can enhance the status of the rm and give the appearance of the rm as a large and trustworthy partner. This can be appealing towards both customers and suppliers, and therefore increase business activity.
In contrast to non-registered rms, the VAT threshold induces smaller or no local changes in incentives for voluntarily registered rms. First, compliance costs do not jump at the threshold for voluntarily registered rms as they are already reporting VAT. Before 2004, there were also no changes in the VAT rate at the threshold, implying no incentives to remain below the threshold, conditional on voluntary registration. In comparison, the VAT relief is applicable also for voluntary registered rms below the threshold after 2004. This implies a jump in the marginal VAT rate at the threshold for voluntarily registered rms, but no discontinuous changes in compliance costs. In our analysis, we utilize this variation for the voluntarily registered rms to provide additional evidence on the sole eect of tax incentives at the threshold.
Bunching at the VAT threshold
Rapidly growing literature utilizes bunching around points that create discontinuous changes in incentives to study the extent of behavioral responses and structural parameters such as elasticities. The bunching approach, rst introduced by Saez (2010) , has been used in wide range of applications, such as income taxes, social transfers and pricing policies. The bunching methodology and recent literature is surveyed in Kleven (2015) . 8 However, there were some minor exceptions for this rule. For example, for performing artists it was possible to declare VAT on a yearly basis.
Intuitively, if a discontinuous change in VAT liability at the threshold aects the behavior of rms, we should nd an excess mass of rms located below the threshold. As discussed above, exceeding the VAT threshold induces a discontinuous increase in both tax liability (remitted VAT) and compliance costs related to VAT reporting. Therefore, the threshold creates a notch to the choice set of rms. Figure 3 illustrates the eects of the VAT threshold on the behavior of rms with smooth and heterogeneous preferences over gross sales (eort of the owner/rm) and after-tax sales (prot before costs). For conceptual simplicity, we denote that rms respond to the threshold. However, a majority of small rms around the threshold are owned and managed by a single owner (almost 90% in our baseline sample). Thus we assume that the owner makes all the relevant rm-level decisions, and the eort of the owner largely contributes to the output of the rm. 
, where s * is the VAT threshold and τ N is the VAT rate. zs denotes the linear function of tax-deductible purchases z needed to generate s, where 0 ≤ z < 1. In the gure, the remitted VAT from below s * is denoted by 
, which implies that the rm pays the VAT only for the value added exceeding s * . Similarly as above, rms at or below s * do not change their behavior when the kink is introduced, but a fraction of rms located between s * and s * + s K will bunch around the threshold. The principal dierence between the notch and kink regimes is that the former creates notably larger tax incentives not to exceed the threshold.
Panel III of Figure 3 introduces compliance costs to the VAT kink schedule. The extended tax function including compliance costs is
denotes the xed compliance cost of VAT reporting. The assumption of xed compliance costs is feasible.
It is presumable that the costs related to lling out VAT forms or acquiring and understanding the VAT rules do not increase or decrease with sales above s * .
The introduction of compliance costs creates an additional notch to the budget set, creating larger incentives to avoid exceeding the threshold and the marginal bunching rm is with sales s * + s 
Determinants of bunching behavior
The behavioral response caused by the VAT threshold is estimated by relating the observed excess mass below the threshold to the counterfactual (Kleven 2015) . This bunching estimate includes responses to both tax incentives, i.e. the sales elasticity with respect to the VAT rate, and compliance costs. Therefore, the cross sectional bunching estimate is a function of two unobserved components;b = b(τ, s * ; e, δ), where e is the underlying VAT rate elasticity and δ denotes the responsiveness to compliance costs. The sales elasticity with respect to the VAT rate is expressed as e = ( s * /s * )/( τ /τ ), where the sales response ( s * /s * ) is related to the change in the VAT rate at the threshold ( τ /τ ). We discuss the practical estimation of the elasticity parameter in detail in the end of Section 2.5.
In our main analysis, we follow the approach in Best et al. (2015) and Gelber et al. (2015) 9 and utilize variation in incentives over time to distinguish between dierent unobserved factors that eect the extent of the bunching behavior. We utilize quasi-experimental variation in both tax incentives and compliance costs to study whether the observed response to the threshold is caused by tax incentives or 9 Best et al. (2015) utilize changes in the location of the turnover/prot tax threshold over time to infer whether the observed response is caused by evasion or real responses. Gelber et al. (2015) utilize changes in the size of the kink created by the Social Security Annual Earnings (AET) in the US test to distinguish between adjustment frictions and earnings elasticity. compliance costs, or both. To do this, we estimate the amount of bunching at the threshold in dierent tax incentive and compliance cost regimes over time.
In the following, we assume that both tax incentives and compliance costs change at the threshold. In the case of the VAT notch (20002003) 
If we assume that tax incentives drive rms to avoid exceeding the threshold, we should observe that
. In other words, there would always be more bunching in the notch schedule compared to the kink regime if the VAT rate drives the response. This hypothesis follows from assuming that the underlying tax rate elasticity e remains constant over time (or at least that e does not jump in a discontinuous fashion at the time of the reform), and that the owners have smooth and heterogeneous preferences over gross sales and after-tax sales. Assuming that b N > b
K is feasible as long as the marginal buncher rm would be located within the VAT relief region (below 22,500 euros)
in the absence of the threshold. In this case,
by denition, because the remitted VAT is smaller for the marginal buncher at given point in the sales distribution above s * (see Moreover, if we assume that compliance costs aect rm responses, we should observe thatb
* ; e, δ C ). This assumption follows from the fact that the compliance cost is smaller after the 2010 reform, and thus overall incentives to avoid VAT liability are smaller.
Our testable hypotheses are the following: In the case that tax incentives fully drive the response, we should observe that the excess mass at the threshold decreases after the VAT relief reform by the full amount implied by the VAT rate elasticity. If the change in excess mass is smaller than that but still signicant, we can deduce that both tax incentives and compliance costs explain the observed responses.
If tax incentives induce no responses, we should nd thatb N ≈b
K . This would indicate that compliance costs dominate in explaining observed responses. For this equality to hold, the following condition needs
. This implies that in order for the marginal buncher rm not to relocate to (s * + s N ) after the VAT rate has decreased, the compliance costs must be equal or greater than the net value added at (s * + s N ) after the reduction in the VAT rate. 10
In addition, if decreased compliance costs reduce the observed excess mass, we should nd that
If compliance costs induce no changes, we should observe similar responses before and after the change in compliance costs. Overall, mutually consistent results from both of the changes in tax 10 Similar hypotheses are also applicable when analyzing dierent changes in the VAT rate across similar services, that is, when comparing the excess mass estimates of hairdressers that experienced a VAT rate reduction and beauty salons that did not face changes in the VAT rate. incentives and compliance costs over time would give us straightforward and convincing evidence on the determinants of the observed response. 
Empirical estimation
where c j is the count of rms in bin j, and s j denotes the sales level in bin j. 
The excess bunching is estimated by relating the actual number of rms close to the threshold within (s L , s * ) to the estimated counterfactual density in the same region:
where N j is the number of bins within [s L , s * ].
As in earlier literature, we determine the lower limit of the excluded region (s L ) based on visual observations of the sales distribution. Intuitively, s L represents the point in the sales distribution where the bunching behavior begins, i.e. the density of rms begins to increase. Due to imperfect control and uncertainty about the exact amount of annual sales, it is likely that we do not observe sharp bunching exactly at the threshold but rather a cluster of rms on a region below it.
We follow the approach of Kleven and Waseem (2013) 11 This condition states that rms who bunch at the threshold come from the region directly above it, as shown in Panel IV of Figure 3 above.
11 Kleven and Waseem (2013) apply this convergence condition to estimate the counterfactual density around individual income tax notches in Pakistan. For individual tax rate kink points in Denmark, Chetty et al. (2011) determine the upper limit visually, and then iteratively adjust the counterfactual density above the kink point such that it includes the excess mass at the kink. This makes the estimated counterfactual density equal to the observed density. These procedures are intuitively similar, but the convergence method of Kleven and Waseem (2013) typically provides a smaller estimate for excess bunching. In addition, the convergence method provides a more justied approach to dene the upper limit of the excluded region when estimating the counterfactual density.
In addition, we relate the estimated excess bunching to the change in the VAT rate at the threshold to calculate the tax rate elasticity. Following Kleven and Waseem (2013), we relate the sales response of the estimated marginal buncher rm to the change in the remitted VAT caused by exceeding the threshold by s.
In more detail, we calculate the elasticity at the VAT notch using the following quadratic formula (following Kleven and Waseem 2013) 
Compared to the VAT notch, the rm needs to pay VAT only for sales above s * within the VAT kink system. This implies that the implicit marginal tax rate ( t N , t K ) is larger at the VAT notch compared to VAT kink with a given sales response s (within the VAT relief region). However, as Figure 2 above shows, the average VAT rate increases above the VAT kink, implying a smoothly increasing marginal VAT rate. Therefore, τ k is not constant in practice, as it increases with s in the VAT relief scheme.
We take this issue into account when calculating the implied elasticity. In addition, we use the bin-level average of the value added of the marginal buncher rm when calculating the implicit VAT rate and the elasticity estimates.
As is customary in the literature, we calculate standard errors for all the estimates using a residualbased bootstrap procedure. We generate a large number of sales distributions by randomly resampling the residuals from equation (1) The data include all information needed for tax purposes, such as sales, taxable prots, assets and organizational form. In addition, we have data on other relevant rm-level variables, including the number of employees, the industry classication and expenses. Also, we can link owner-level variables to the rm-level data, such as personal taxable wage and capital income of the main owner of the rm.
The owner-level data are available from 2002 onward.
In the following analysis, we exclude all rms that operate in sectors that are not subject to VAT, such as nancial and insurance activities, letting and operation of dwellings, education, and health and social work activities. Since these rms are not liable to pay VAT, it is not relevant to include them in the analysis of behavioral responses to the VAT threshold. In addition, in our baseline analysis we restrict the sample to include only rms with annual sales below 20,000 euros, since these rms can be though of as being aected by the threshold. Furthermore, we exclude rms that are taxed by the assessment of the Finnish Tax Administration, as tax record information based on assessment does not provide evidence of behavioral choices of rms in response to the VAT threshold. The most common reason for assessed taxation is that a rm has not returned its tax forms in time.
3.2 Characteristics of small rms and their main owners of the rms in our sample do not have any employees, and have relatively low taxable prots, expenses and assets. The relative value-added of these rms is generally relatively large. This stems from the fact that the expense-to-sales ratio is typically small. This implies that the eort of the entrepreneur mostly contributes to the value added. In addition, the high value added relative to sales also indicates that the tax incentives created by the VAT threshold are relevant for most small rms and their owners.
The table shows that sole proprietor is clearly the most common organizational form among small rms in Finland, as almost 70% of small rms in our sample are sole proprietors. One fth of the rms in the sample are privately-held corporations, and 9% are partnership rms. Overall, 90% of the rms in our sample are owned by a single entrepreneur. Furthermore, small rms represent a wide variety of dierent industries. However, a large share of rms (36%) operate on the service sector, which is a typical industry for single-owned rms and sole proprietors.
In addition to rm-level characteristics, we are able to link rms to their main owners from 2002
onward. The lower panel of Table 1 describes the owner-level tax record data. Overall, the average total income of the owner (the sum of taxable wage and capital income) is relatively low, approximately 16,600 euros. However, there is a lot of heterogeneity with respect to the income level of the owner. Table 1 shows that over 50% of the owners in our sample have very low personal taxable income (below 10,000 euros). Approximately 20% of the owners have personal income between 10,00020,000 euros, and roughly 30% of the owners have personal income above 20,000 euros.
In order to more specically describe the role of the rm in terms of personal income, we dene owners as 'full-time' entrepreneurs if the annual turnover of the rm is larger than the total income of the owner. It appears that most of the owners fulll our denition of a full-time entrepreneur, as over 50% of all main owners in our sample have more annual turnover in their rm than they have total personal income. Also, 'full-time' owners are distributed equally across gender. Therefore, the descriptive statistics suggest that side businesses do not comprise the majority of our sample. Despite the relatively low level of sales, some small rms are the main source of income for their owner. Nevertheless, potential heterogeneous responses to the VAT threshold could be important in terms of interpreting the results.
For example, the implications of behavioral responses could be dierent if only side businesses respond to the threshold. In Section 4.1, we study responses to the VAT threshold separately for dierent types of rms and owners. Figure 4 shows that excess bunching is striking. A visually signicant proportion of small rms locate themselves just below the VAT threshold. In addition, the estimate for excess bunching is notable and strongly signicant statistically. These imply that the VAT threshold clearly aects the reported sales of small rms. The sales distribution is otherwise rather smooth, with the exception of round-number bunching, which can be seen as spikes in the distribution at convenient round numbers such as 5,000 and 10,000 euros. Nevertheless, bunching is much more evident below the VAT threshold than in any of the round numbers, implying apparent behavioral responses to the threshold.
In our baseline analysis, the lower limit of the excluded range is -9, and the counterfactual density is estimated using a 7th-order polynomial function. Table 3 in the Appendix shows the results when we vary those choices. Overall, the conclusion of distinctive excess bunching is robust to dierent choices.
Varying the order of polynomial from 4 to 10 provides statistically similar results. Decreasing the lower limit from -4 to -15 increases the excess bunching estimate, but estimates using smaller values than -9 provides statistically similar results. As an additional robustness check, we follow Kleven and Waseem (2013) and estimate the counterfactual density taking round-number bunching into account. However, this does not aect the excess bunching estimate in a signicant manner (see Figure 18 in the Appendix).
In addition, we study the heterogeneity of the overall response. Table 2 shows the excess bunching estimates separately for dierent types of owners and rms. In general, we nd signicant excess mass estimates and observe visually clear bunching in all subgroups. This indicates that the overall response is not driven by certain groups of rms and owners that would respond very actively while other groups
would not respond at all.
However, we nd some dierences across dierent types of owners and rms. First, female owners (excess mass 4.2) appear to bunch more actively than male owners (3.0). In particular, females classied as 'full-time' owners (personal taxable income < turnover of the rm) bunch actively (5.1). One potential explanation could be that household secondary earners, who are typically women, respond more.
Unfortunately, our data do not include information on household characteristics, and we are therefore unable to analyze this issue more thoroughly. Nevertheless, we observe clear bunching both for men and high-income entrepreneurs, which implies that the eects caused by the threshold appear not be in any way limited to secondary earners.
In addition, sole proprietors (3.7) seem to bunch more actively than partnership rms (2.4) and corporations (2.1). Overall, the general administrative burden is typically smaller for a sole proprietor compared to corporations and partnership rms. For example, only sole proprietors are entitled to use single-entry bookkeeping. However, VAT regulations and VAT reporting do not dier between organizational forms, which implies that rms with dierent organizational forms face very similar incentives not to exceed the VAT threshold. In addition, rms in the service industry bunch more actively than others, but bunching is signicant in all industry categories and thus not driven by certain industries.
Furthermore, we divide rms into quartiles based on their expense-to-sales ratios. This ratio approximates the value added of the rm, and thus describes the variation in remitted VAT at the threshold between dierent rms. However, this classication does not provide exogenous variation in terms of tax incentives, as many other factors that could aect rm responses also play a role in the composition of sales and expenses of a rm. For example, it could be more straightforward for rms operating in sectors with low expenses to adjust their annual sales, regardless of the size of the incentive. Also, rms with large expenses are more likely to voluntarily register for VAT, which signicantly decreases the incentives to respond to the threshold.
12 We nd that rms with smaller expense-to-sales ratios bunch more actively than others. Nevertheless, also rms with large relative expenses respond to the threshold, but in signicantly lesser extent.
Finally, many of the observed rm and owner-level characteristics are correlated with each other.
For example, women have, on average, lower personal total income (11,400 euros) in our estimation sample, and over 90% of female-owned rms are sole proprietors. Also, it is likely that rms with smaller expense-to-sales ratios, such as rms operating in the service sector, have more annual transactions than other similar sized rms. This implies that both compliance costs of VAT reporting and implied tax incentives are larger among these rms. Therefore, we are not in general able to distinguish which of 12 For example, in 2009, 34% of rms below the threshold were voluntarily registered for VAT in the smallest input/sales quartile, as the share was 59% among the highest quartile. the characteristics or incentives fully explain larger excess bunching among various groups. In the next subchapter, we utilize variation in tax incentives and compliance costs to study the mechanisms behind the observed response. We further discuss heterogeneous responses to the threshold in terms of welfare implications in Section 4.4. To understand the implications of size-based thresholds, it is important to know why rms respond to them. In the case of VAT threshold, small rms could respond to it both because of tax incentives and compliance costs. From policy perspective, its crucial to know whether aecting tax incentives, compliance costs or both would aect the behavior of rms, and the distortions caused by the threshold.
We begin by studying the change from the VAT notch system to the VAT kink system. Intuitively, if the remitted VAT at the threshold matters, we should nd notably less rms bunching below the VAT kink compared to the VAT notch. 
13
These ndings indicate that despite the drastic drop in remitted VAT above the threshold after 2004, we nd no signicant changes in the behavioral response to the VAT threshold. This implies that other 13 This dierence of estimates is calculated as follows: We rst estimate a large number of excess mass estimates for both VAT notch and VAT kink periods using the bootstrap procedure explained in Section 2.5. After each round, we calculate the dierence of the excess mass estimates, and then calculate the standard deviation of the average dierence to examine whether or not the dierence in excess bunching between the regimes is signicantly dierent from zero. 
This implies that the two sectors did not dier in terms of behavioral responses
to the threshold, regardless that the VAT rate for hairdressers was reduced by nearly 60% in the latter period. This result provides further evidence that change in tax incentives do not aect the bunching behavior. It is important to note that potential issues related to understanding the changes in the overall VAT system within the VAT relief reform do not play a role in Figure 6 . In 20042009, the overall VAT system was not changed, apart from the experiment on reduced rates for specic types of services.
14 Kosonen (2015) studies the price and demand eects of this targeted VAT rate reduction for hairdressers using beauty salons as a comparison group. 15 This dierence is calculated similarly as described in footnote 13. 
Compliance costs
Next, we study the eects of the compliance costs of VAT reporting in more detail. In 2010, compliance costs were reduced in two ways: First, rms no longer needed to le a separate declaration form to apply for the VAT relief. After 2010, only a simple tick in a box in the regular VAT form was required.
Second, small rms with annual sales below 25,000 euros are required to le their VAT report annually, in contrast to monthly reporting before 2010. is a visible decrease in the excess mass after 2010. The estimate for the dierence in excess bunching 16 We slightly modify our estimation strategy when estimating excess bunching for the voluntarily registered rms. As these rms do not respond to the threshold in a signicant manner, we do not observe any drop in the sales distribution above the threshold. Therefore, our baseline iteration method where the upper limit of the excluded region is dened such that the excess mass equals the missing mass above the threshold does not converge. Thus we simplify the estimation method by using a xed upper limit (28) . Altering the choice of the xed upper limit does not change the result in any signicant way. 17 . These results imply that the reduction in costs related to VAT reporting had a notable eect on behavior, in contrast to changes in tax incentives analyzed above. We do not directly observe the awareness of the VAT relief among rms and entrepreneurs, but we do observe from the register data whether a rm has applied for the relief. Thus we can characterize the general knowledge of the VAT relief by studying how many rms above the threshold apply for the relief, 17 This dierence is calculated similarly as described in footnote 13.
and how this behavior was aected by the 2010 reform. However, the level of this take-up rate is likely to not give us accurate information about the actual awareness. Firms might not apply for the relief if the perceived cost of applying exceeds the monetary benet. This is particularly relevant for rms with a large expense-to-sales ratio, as the relative eect of the relief in the remitted VAT is smaller for them. Figure 19 in the Appendix shows that there is no excess mass of rms below these sales thresholds. The small and sharp spike exactly at 25,000 euros is likely to be a round-number eect, which is also detectable at other convenient round numbers such as 30,000 and 40,000 euros. However, reporting frequency thresholds only describe reporting costs at the intensive margin, that is, when the VAT threshold is already exceeded and the xed cost of VAT reporting is already materialized. Thus Figure 19 highlights that simply changing the required reporting frequency for rms that are already reporting VAT is not likely to aect rm behavior.
Summary
To summarize, our comprehensive analysis utilizing changes in both the VAT rate and compliance costs over time shows that changes in tax incentives do not aect the behavior of small rms, whereas compliance costs appear to be much more important. Figure 11 puts these ndings together by presenting excess mass estimates and the implied tax elasticity estimates in dierent years. The elasticity estimates are calculated by relating the sales response of the marginal buncher rm to the change in the remitted VAT, as described in Section 2.5 above. Following the earlier tax responsiveness literature, this elasticity measure thus assumes that the change in the VAT rate at the threshold fully induces the behavioral response.
First, we nd no changes in excess bunching at the threshold after 2004. We do not observe even a gradual decrease in excess bunching in time that would be consistent with entrepreneurs gradually learning the change in tax incentives. In contrast, we observe a sharp drop in excess bunching right after the decrease in compliance costs in 2010.
Second, we nd a clear jump in the tax rate elasticity estimate right after 2004. This is reasonable as the extent of the behavioral response did not change, but the 2004 reform notably decreased the remitted VAT for the marginal buncher rm. However, it is implausible that the underlying tax rate responsiveness would have experienced such a notable and sudden hike. For the elasticity estimate to remain constant, we should have observed an excess mass of approximately 0.9 after 2004. However, the observed excess bunching estimate does not at all, and is above 3 in both before and after 2004. Thus this evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that the response is driven by compliance costs, and not by the VAT rate. Our results highlight the key role of compliance costs in the behavior of small rms. This indicates that the reporting and cognitive costs related to the threshold are mainly causing the distortive eects of this size-based regulation. Intuitively, compliance costs are largely xed, that is, they do not increase in sales above the threshold. Thus the relative signicance of them is likely to be more relevant for smaller rms than for larger rms. Therefore, as a policy conclusion, our results point that reducing and simplifying reporting procedures are likely to decrease the welfare costs of size-based rules among small rms. We discuss the implications related to the optimal level of the VAT threshold in Section 5.
Finally, we utilize our results to approximate the magnitude of the compliance cost created by the VAT threshold. To do this, we assume that the entire response is caused by compliance costs, as indicated by the above results. Therefore, we interpret the response of the marginal buncher to stem from compliance costs only. In other words, using the overall response in 20002013, we calculate how much of net value added the marginal buncher rm/entrepreneur is willing to forgo in order to locate just below the threshold.
We nd that the compliance costs of the threshold are approximately 1,600 euros. This estimate is larger than the typical survey-based evaluations of compliance costs for rms, ranging from approximately 600800 euros (Crawford et al. 2010 ). Our approach adds to this literature by estimating the signicance and magnitude of compliance costs for entrepreneurs using quasi-experimental variation and local nonlinear estimation methods.
Anatomy of the response
Irrespective of whether rms actively stay below the VAT threshold because of tax incentives or compliance costs, it is important to know how rms adjust their behavior. In terms of policy implications, it is relevant to know whether rms respond by decreasing output, or by engaging in active avoidance or evasion measures. Responses along all behavioral margins aect tax revenue. However, changes in real economic activity, in this case decreasing the (true) output of the rm, can be considered more detrimental in terms of welfare, whereas changes through avoidance and evasion might not aect the real allocation of resources with a similar magnitude (see, e.g., Slemrod 1992 and Slemrod and Gillitzer 2014). Furthermore, it could be easier for the government to aect evasion and avoidance responses by more eectively monitoring small rms. In contrast, it is more dicult to inuence changes in the real economic activity of rms.
To study whether responses are driven by real responses or avoidance/evasion, we examine how the production factors that rms are obliged to report to the Tax Administration, such as the level of equity, expenses and wages paid to the employees, evolve around the VAT threshold. This descriptive analysis aims at illustrating the mechanisms related to the observed patterns of responses, rather than providing rigorous causal evidence on avoidance or evasion. Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2016) use a similar analysis when studying the anatomy of the eect of a tax enforcement threshold for large rms in Spain.
How would we predict various rm-level variables to evolve around the VAT threshold? If evasion through underreporting of sales is the main explanation for why rms locating themselves below the threshold, we should nd that the level of reported expenses, wages and equity levels are larger just below the threshold. In other words, if sales are systematically underreported, we should observe the bunching rms to be larger than other rms around the threshold. It is important to note that rms both below and above the threshold have clear incentives to (honestly) report expenses and wages, as they need to pay taxes on their prots (sales minus expenses and wages). Therefore, in terms of minimizing taxes, there are no incentives to underreport any occured costs that are tax deductible. Thus in the absence of evasion responses, production factors should develop smoothly around the VAT threshold as the sales of the rm increase.
Another explanation for the bunching behavior could be avoidance. One way to avoid rm-level VAT liability is to set up multiple rms and report sales of each entity separately such that the threshold is never exceeded. This type of behavior has been previously detected for large rms (Onji 2009 ). We test this hypothesis by examining the average number of rms per an individual owner around the threshold.
If avoidance behavior explains the bunching response, we should nd the average number of rms per owner to be signicantly larger just below the threshold than above it.
If we do not detect evidence on evasion or avoidance, it suggest that rms respond by reducing real output. However, as in other studies utilizing register-based data and quasi-experimental variation in incentives, we do not observe intentional misreporting of the overall business activity, such as operating fully or partly in the black market. Therefore, our results do not provide conclusive evidence on potential evasion responses. Figure 12 shows the development rm-level factors around the VAT threshold using pooled data from
20022013. In the gure, we plot a local polynomial function with 95% condence intervals using a bandwidth of 100 euros to illustrate potential changes in production factors around the threshold.
The upper two graphs show that the levels of rm-level equity and total wages paid to employees increase smoothly as the sales of the rm increase. In other words, there are no jumps in these variables at the VAT threshold. This implies that rms around both sides of the threshold are equal in size, and
gives a rst piece of evidence that otherwise larger rms do not locate themselves below the threshold by underreporting their sales.
The lower-left graph in Figure 12 shows that the level of expenses jump just above the threshold signicantly, indicating that rms just below the VAT threshold use less expenses to achieve a similar level of sales. However, this evidence does not point to active evasion or avoidance responses below the threshold. In contrast, it rather suggests that rms just below the threshold have higher prot margins and productivity. The lower-right graph in Figure 12 also supports this view. The rm prots are, on average, larger just below the VAT threshold and decrease sharply right above the threshold. This is an intuitive result, as rms below the threshold do not need to pay the VAT, and thus have higher after-tax prots than similar rms with equal selling prices above the threshold who are subject to VAT. In order to more rigorously examine whether or not there are statistically signicant dierences in the production factors at the threshold, we utilize the regression discontinuity (RD) method. Again, the RD approach does not identify the causal impact of evasion, but oers us a way to investigate statistical inferences of the potential dierences in production factors at the VAT threshold.
18 Table 4 in the Appendix shows these results. The level of equity seems to be statistically insignicantly dierent around both sides of the threshold. For wages, we observe a statistically signicant increase at the threshold, but the dierence is very small (56 euros). In contrast, the level of expenses is clearly smaller among rms below the threshold, when compared to rms above it. Consistently, also the reported prots are signicantly larger for rms below the threshold. Therefore, these results are in line with the previous graphical ndings. The right-hand side of Figure 13 presents the number of rms per owner when excluding sole proprietors. This graph indicates that the number of rms per owner just below the VAT threshold is larger 18 In a more technical detail, we follow the method presented in Calonico et al. (2014) by implementing a local polynomial RD point estimator with robust condence intervals. We use a local linear regression with quadratic bias correction, triangular kernel function to construct the estimator, and mean squared error optimal bandwidths. than above it. This implies that at least some owners appear to set up multiple partnership rms or corporations in order to avoid VAT liability. Nevertheless, this nding does not explain the overall bunching result. Table 2 shows that excess bunching is evident among all types of rms and owners. In fact, in comparison to sole proprietors, the average excess bunching is even somewhat smaller for partnership rms and corporations. 
Growth eects
Size-based thresholds tend to create incentives for rms to stay small. This potentially induces negative eects on rm growth and implies signicant eciency losses. The panel structure of the data allows us to follow rms over time, and thus examine the eects of the VAT threshold on rm growth.
We begin by examining the persistence rates in bunching over time. The persistence rate denotes the probability that rms remain in the same bin, for example, after one year. Figure 14 In general, potential negative growth eects produce dierent welfare implications among dierent types of rms. If low-income entrepreneurs are locked below the threshold for many consecutive years, the threshold has direct implications for the well-being of these individuals. In contrast, the relative eects on disposable income are less pronounced for part-time entrepreneurs with signicant income outside the rm. Nevertheless, the welfare eects could also be notable for this group. In general, it is inecient if high-productive rms locate themselves below the threshold repeatedly. Furthermore, it could be more ecient in terms of overall productivity if the entrepreneur would work full time in a high-productive rm instead of being a wage earner. This potential could become unrealized if the threshold prevents these rms from growing. Furthermore, it could be that in the long run these rms would hire additional workers in the absence of this growth barrier. Figure 15 presents the average growth rates of sales around the VAT threshold by owner-level income groups. We calculate one-year logarithmic growth rates (t − (t − 1)) of sales conditional on locating in 200 euro sales bins in the base year t − 1. The upper-left panel of the gure shows that the average growth rate jumps just above the threshold among entrepreneurs with very low personal income (earned + capita income < 10,000 euros). Among owners with income between 10,000 and 20,000 euros, the growth rate also increases above the threshold (upper-right panel) but not as much as among the lowest income group. In contrast, the average growth rates seem to be rather stable around the threshold among owners with higher income levels. This indicates that the VAT threshold appears to signicantly decrease the growth of rms especially among owners with low income levels, but the lock-in eect is not signicantly present for owners who have access for signicant income outside the rm. To summarize, the VAT threshold aects the dynamic decisions of rms and distorts the whole distribution of rms. Our evidence supports the view that bunching behavior is very permanent, as a signicant share of rms avoid exceeding the threshold for many consecutive years. According to our results, this negative growth eect is focused on low-income entrepreneurs rather than part-time owners with signicant income outside the rm. This indicates that the threshold has direct eects particularly on the well-being of low-income entrepreneurs. Moreover, a comparison between Finnish and Swedish rms that operate in labor intensive industries supports the overall conclusion that the VAT threshold has notable eects on growth, highlighting the detrimental dynamic eects of the threshold.
Conclusions
We nd that the VAT threshold causes extensive and signicant behavioral responses among small rms in Finland. Our results oer evidence that even considerable reductions in the VAT rate do not aect the extent of the bunching response. However, we observe that a reduction in compliance costs related to the VAT registration decrease the amount of excess mass at the threshold. This evidence strongly suggests that compliance are driving the responses. Also, we nd no direct evidence of tax avoidance or evasion, nor that splitting larger rms into smaller entities would explain the response. Therefore, we interpret rms avoid exceeding the threshold by lowering their true output, representing real economic responses. In addition, we examine the rm growth eects and nd evidence that the bunching behavior is very permanent. The threshold seems to solely hinder the growth of low-income entrepreneurs.
Our results suggest that the VAT threshold has clear welfare consequences among small rms. We have three pieces of evidence to support the view of relatively signicant welfare eects. First, we oer evidence that rms decrease their real economic activity to avoid VAT liability. Real economic responses are more detrimental in terms of welfare consequences than avoidance or evasion responses (see, e.g., Slemrod (1992) ). Second, our results imply that compliance costs cause rms to locate themselves just below the threshold for many consecutive years. This clearly aects the overall distribution of rms, and thus has notable impacts on eciency. Third, we nd that the negative growth eects are largest among very low-income entrepreneurs. Therefore, the threshold has direct implications for the well-being of these individuals that are likely to be larger than the similar eect among part-time entrepreneurs having signicant income outside the rm.
The results show that reducing and simplifying reporting procedures decrease the welfare costs of size-based rules among small rms. By lowering the costs of VAT registration and reporting VAT would clearly reduce the amount of detrimental behavioral responses to the threshold both within a year and over time. In the Finnish case this would be possible, for example, by making the VAT relief system automatic or including the VAT reporting to a single annually led income tax form.
Our results also oer estimates for approximating the optimal VAT threshold based on the theoretical results developed by Keen and Mintz (2004) . They nd that the optimal threshold depends on several dierent factors, such as administrative costs, compliance costs, the VAT tax rate, the ratio of valueadded to sales and the marginal cost of public funds. 20 Many of these parameters are directly observed like the VAT rate and administrative costs but clearly the level of compliance costs and the marginal cost of public funds need to be estimated by using data.
Based on our empirical results we approximated the compliance costs for rms to be 1,600 euros due to the VAT threshold. This estimate helps us to approximate the optimal VAT threshold in Finland.
Suppose rst that the marginal cost of public funds is 1.3. Then with a VAT rate of 24% (standard VAT rate in Finland), a ratio of value-added to sales of 70% (calculated in our baseline sample) and an administrative costs of 320 euros (following Crawford et al. (2010) and assuming that 20% of compliance costs represent administrative costs of tax authority), we approximate the optimal VAT threshold to be 32,000 euros in Finland. This estimate is clearly larger than the current level of VAT threshold (10,000 euros) in Finland. 20 Keen and Mintz show that the formula for the optimal VAT threhold is the following: z * = δA+C (δ−1)τ N , where δ denotes the marginal cost of public funds, τ is the VAT rate, N is the ratio of value-added to sales, A is administrative costs and C is compliance costs. Order of polynomial (baseline=7) Table 4 : Dierences in production factors across the threshold calculated using the regression discontinuity approach
